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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
It should be noted that there is "a societal interest in providing
a speedy trial which exists separate from . . . the interests of the
accused."4 Society's interest stems from the backlog increase from
delay in bringing cases to trial, the opportunity for those released
on bail to commit other crimes, the temptation for the accused to
jump bail, and escape, and the detrimental effect on rehabilitation
from the delay between arrest and punishment." It is suggested that
these interests are not served by the present status of speedy trial
case law. Perhaps a solution which would take into account the
interests of both society and the accused can be found. However,
any change which would enhance the rights of the accused is doubt-
ful in light of the "general indifference to the rights of those accused
of crime exhibited by the Supreme Court under the leadership of
Chief Justice Burger. . . ."I' The end result is that the interests of
both society and the accused will suffer.
JAMES E. PANNY
Expanded Right to Voluntary Dismissal Upheld
In the noted case, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
right to take a voluntary dismissal is absolute and can be had
even after the judge has granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. The author, after reviewing the history and case law on
voluntary dismissals, concludes that although the decision was a
correct one in light of the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420
(a)(1), the purpose of the rule would be better served if it were
revised so as to put greater limitations on the availability of a
voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff.
Petitioner and her husband brought suit against respondents
and the Insurance Company of North America, to recover damages
resulting from an automobile accident. At the charge conference,
is apparent in murder cases, such as MacDonald's, where there is no statute of limitations.
18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1970) reads: "An indictment for any offense punishable by death may be
found at any time without limitation except for offenses barred by the provisions of law
existing on August 4, 1939."
43. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
44. Id. at 519-20.
45. Rudstein, supra note 7, at 58.
[Vol. 30:1092
CASES NOTED
while the jury was in recess, the trial court granted respondents'
motion for a directed verdict on petitioner's claim for loss of consor-
tium.' Petitioner then sought to "take a voluntary nonsuit" on this
claim. The trial court permitted her "to take a voluntary non-
dismissal," and submitted only the claim of her husband to the
jury.2 Subsequently, petition again instituted suit against the re-
spondents for loss of consortium. Respondents moved to dismiss
by raising the defense of res judicata. The trial court granted the
motion and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The District Court
of Appeal, First District, affirmed on the ground that the suit was
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.3 The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida, on conflict certiorari review,4 held, quashed and remanded: The
plaintiff's right to take a nonsuit or voluntary dismissal, pursuant
to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1), is absolute, and such
dismissal does not constitute res judicata even when taken after the
trial court had announced, out of the jury's presence,' that a de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict was granted. Fears v. Luns-
ford, 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975).1
Voluntary dismissals, currently provided for by Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.420 (a)(1), have had a torturous and rather con-
fusing development in Florida law. Part of this confusion may be
attributed to the terminology used by the courts, which has not
1. Although not entirely clear, it appears from the record that the court granted the
motion, and that, thereafter, the plaintiff announced that he was taking a voluntary dis-
missal. See Record of Trial on Dec. 8, 1972. But see Respondent's Brief at 3-4. See also
Petitioner's Brief, Fears v. Lunsford, 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975) at 2-4.
2. Petitioner's Brief at 2-4.
3. Fears v. Lunsford, 295 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
4. The supreme court found conflict between the majority opinion of the District Court
of Appeal, First District, in the instant case, and prior decisions of the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, in Meyer v. Contemporary Broad. Co., 207 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1968) and Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 244 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970).
5. Although the supreme court did not elaborate on the significance of the trial court's
decision to grant a directed verdict being made out of the jury's presence, it seems that in
light of Meyer v. Contemporary Broad. Co., 207 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968), this fact
may be quite significant. See note 34 infra.
6. It appears from the briefs submitted by counsel to both the district court of appeal
and the supreme court that the correct basis for reversal was first brought forth by Judge
McCord in his dissenting opinion in the district court of appeal. Prior to Judge McCord's
dissent, neither petitioner nor respondent had argued Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.420(a)(1). It appears that petitioner's argument in the district court of appeal was addressed
to the propriety of the defense of res judicata and the dismissal of the complaint with preju-
dice. See Respondent's Brief at 13.
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always distinguished between a voluntary dismissal and a voluntary
nonsu it.
7
At early common law, a plaintiff had an absolute right to termi-
nate his litigation at any stage of the proceedings before the verdict
was read.' Florida, by statute, recognized this right as early as 1828,
but limited it by requiring that the nonsuit be taken before the jury
retired.'
Since an absolute right to nonsuit was generally considered
unjustly advantageous to the plaintiff, who could subject the de-
fendant to multiple and expensive lawsuits, the majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions have either eliminated the right to nonsuit or have
limited it to specified stages of the proceedings.'' In light of this
development, and to curb the abuses that had commonly occurred
under state procedures," Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 was
7. The nonsuit at early common law was a dismissal of the plaintiff's action without an
adjudication other than the imposition of costs. It did not constitute a bar to a subsequent
action on the same cause. The common law nonsuit was recognized in Florida by statute, but
subject to certain limitations. See note 9 infra. In 1954, with the adoption of Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.35, the right of a plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal was established.
Thus it appears that the term nonsuit came to be associated with the common law and
statutory right to voluntary dismissal of the action, while the term "voluntary dismissal" was
associated with that same right as provided in the rules of procedure. Today, however, even
with the abolition of nonsuits, practitioners still use the term. This has prompted the Su-
preme Court of Florida and other Florida courts to hold that a decision of a lower court will
not be condemned because it mistakenly refers to a nonsuit instead of a voluntary dismissal,
provided that the requirements for a voluntary dismissal have been generally followed and
the effect of the nonsuit is the same as that of a voluntary dismissal. See Continental Aviation
Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 183 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1966) and Peaslee v. Michalski,
184 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
8. For a history of voluntary dismissal and nonsuit at common law, see Note, The Right
of a Plaintiff to Take a Voluntary Nonsuit or to Dismiss His Action Without Prejudice, 37
VA. L. REV. 969 (1951).
9. The original statute was the Act of Nov. 23, 1828, § 69-70. This statute, by providing
that "[nlo plaintiff shall take a non-suit on trial unless he do so before the jury retire from
the bar," had been interpreted to mean that the common law nonsuit did exist in Florida,
limited by the requirement that it be taken before the jury retired. See J. Schnarr & Co. v.
Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 118 Fla. 258, 159 So. 39 (1934). However, Florida Statutes
section 54.09 which was the modern version of the 1828 statute, was superseded by the 1962
revision of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.35 (the purpose of which was to remove the
use of nonsuits from Florida civil procedure), and was finally repealed in 1967. See Crews v.
Dobson, 177 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
10. See note 27 infra.
11. Until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts were re-
quired under the Conformity Act to apply state procedure on voluntary dismissals in actions
at law, though they were not so compelled in suits in equity. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255 § 5,
17 Stat. 197, Rev. Stat. § 914 repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646 § 39, 62 Stat. 992.
See Carnegie Nat'l Bank v. City of Wolf Point, 110 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1940). State
[Vol. 30:1092
CASES NOTED
promulgated in 1938, severely limiting the common law nonsuit in
federal courts." Under this federal rule the right to take a voluntary
dismissal is limited to the period before the adverse party has served
an answer or filed a motion for summary judgment.'3
In 1954, when the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted, those sections of rule 1.35 concerning voluntary dismissal
were virtually identical to the federal rule." Thus, it seemed that
Florida intended to restrict its statutory nonsuit. However, included
in rule 1.35 (2)(b) were the words "nothing stated herein shall pre-
clude a nonsuit from being taken pursuant to any applicable stat-
ute." Those words were thought to preserve Florida's statutory non-
suit, although they were clearly inconsistent with the intent of rule
1.35(a) to limit the use of voluntary dismissal.'" Thus, although
Florida had a rule purporting to limit the common law right to a
nonsuit, a plaintiff could still freely avail himself of this right by
practices permitted a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his suit at varying stages of the
proceedings.
12. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2363 (1971).
13. Rule 41 has been amended eight times since it was originally promulgated in 1938.
The amendments, however, have been insignificant. The present text of rule 41(a)(1) is as
follows:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United
States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an
answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by
filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dis-
missal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in
any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the
same claim.
14. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a)(1) (1954) originally provided:
Subject to the provisions hereof, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment or decree,
whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all
parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal shall be without prejudice, except that a
dismissal shall operate as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plain-
tiff who has once dismissed in any court of this State an action based on or
including the same claim.
(emphasis added).
15. See Hardee v. Gordon Thompson Chevrolet, Inc., 154 So. 2d 174, 177 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1963); Welgoss v. End, 112 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959); Ramsey v. Aranson, 99 So. 2d 643
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1957). See also Note, Florida's Unique Dismissal-The Non-suit, 13 U. FLA. L.
REV. 105 (1960), for a discussion of the nonsuit prior to the 1962 revision of rule 1.35.
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invoking rule 1.35(2)(b)."6
To further compound the confusion, in 1962 the Florida rules
were amended, and the clause concerning nonsuits was omitted
without explanation. Thus, the courts were left with the problem of
determining whether the omission was meant to eliminate the statu-
tory nonsuit. The problem was finally resolved in 1965 when the
Supreme Court of Florida held, in Crews v. Dobson, 7 that nonsuits
had been abolished. However, shortly thereafter, the Florida rules
were again revised, altering the substance of the voluntary nonsuit
by extending the absolute right to take one voluntary dismissal to
any time prior to the retirement of the jury." Thus, although Crews
effectively abolished statutory nonsuits in Florida, the 1965 revision
to rule 1.35 created a voluntary dismissal similar to the old nonsuit,
though more limited in scope, with respect to actions at law tried
by a jury.'" The changes made in 1965 have been carried over to rule
1.420 (a)(1) with only minor additions.2"'
Thus, subject to certain limitations,"' a plaintiff, under rule
16. See sources cited in note 15 supra.
17. 177 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965), aff'g 164 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
18. The 1965 revision of rule 1.35(a)(1), effective January, 1966, reads as follows:
Except in actions wherein property has been seized or is in the custody of the
court, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without leave of court (i) by
serving a notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing on motion for summary
judgment, or if none is served, or if such motion is denied, before retirement of
the jury in a case tried before a jury or before submission of a nonjuy case to the
court for decision, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties
who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dis-
missal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of
dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when served by a plaintiff
who has once dismissed in any court an action based on or including the same
claim.
(emphasis added).
19. Indeed, it appears that the new rule actually accomplished an extension of the
concept of nonsuit by specifying the plaintiff's right to take a voluntary dismissal "before
submission of a nonjury case to the court for decision ..... " This language of the rule
appears to extend the practice so that it is now available in actions at law without a jury,
and in suits in equity where it had never existed before. For a discussion of cases which
substantiate the view that Florida Statutes section 54.09, the nonsuit statute, by its reference
to a jury, impliedly limited nonsuit to actions at law with a jury, and precluded its use in
suits in equity, see Comment, Florida's Unique Dismissal-The Non-suit, 13 U. FLA. L. REV.
105 (1960).
20. In 1967, a sentence was added at the end of the first paragraph stating "if a lis
pendens has been filed in the action, a notice or stipulation of dismissal under this paragraph
shall be recorded and cancels the lis pendens without the necessity of an order of court." The
purpose of this was to automatically cancel any lis pendens filed in action.
21. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(2) provides that a voluntary dismissal is not
[Vol. 30:1092
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1.420(a)(1) as it presently stands, may obtain dismissal of an action
without order of court by serving or by stating on the record, during
trial, his notice of dismissal. Such notice of dismissal may be given
at any time before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment,
or if the motion has been denied, before the jury retires or before
the case is submitted to the judge.22 A voluntary dismissal taken
pursuant to this rule serves to divest the court of jurisdiction;"
however, some conflict does exist as to the exact time at which the
court loses jurisdiction. 4
Under the present Florida rule, it has been held that the plain-
tiff's right to a voluntary dismissal is an absolute right," and can
available to a plaintiff as a matter of right where a counterclaim has been served on plaintiff
prior to the notice of dismissal. In those cases, a dismissal may be obtained only by court
order, and such order will not be granted over defendant's objection unless the counterclaim
can remain standing for independent adjudication. Furthermore, even in the absence of a
counterclaim, a voluntary dismissal cannot be obtained as of right when "property has been
seized or is in the custody of the court," FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1); or when important
matters such as the status of seized lands, the title to said lands and the deposit held by the
court are left unresolved. O'Sullivan v. City of Deerfield Beach, 232 So. 2d 33, 34-35 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1970). Similarly, in an action for divorce, plaintiff-husband could not voluntarily
dismiss as of right after defendant-wife had moved for temporary custody of the minor
children of the parties. Cooper v. Cooper, 194 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
A somewhat different situation was presented in Hutchins v. City of Hialeah, 196 So. 2d
741 (Fla. 1967). In that case, the Supreme Court of Florida held it improper to allow a plaintiff
to take a voluntary dismissal with prejudice against a codefendant when the action might
result in a higher award of compensatory damages against the remaining defendant. In
Hutchins a police officer and his employer, the City of Hialeah, were sued for assault and
battery. The trial court awarded damages of $1,227.25 against the officer and $32,627.25
against the city. A new trial was granted on the basis that the city could not be assessed
compensatory damages in excess of those assessed against the active tortfeasor. At the new
trial, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the officer and obtained a verdict for $15,000 against
the city. The supreme court held it was error to have allowed dismissal of the police officer.
22. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1)(i). Two other types of voluntary dismissal are also pro-
vided for in the rule: Subsection (a)(1)(ii) provides for voluntary dismissal by stipulation
signed by all of the parties dismissing the action, and 1.420(a)(2) provides for voluntary
dismissal by order of court "upon such terms and condition as the court deems proper."
23. The trial court loses jurisdiction to proceed further once a notice of dismissal has
been timely filed. Gate City, Inc. v. Arnold Constr. Co., 243 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
24. Compare Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 244 So. 2d 526 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1970), where a voluntary dismissal served to terminate the action and divest the
court of jurisdiction upon its filing, thus preventing a plaintiff from reinstating his case after
having taken a voluntary dismissal, with Cooper v. Carroll, 239 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970),
where the action was reinstated when plaintiff urged that he had mistakenly dismissed all
defendants when he only intended to dismiss one. Thus it appears that while the Rich Motors
court assumed that loss of jurisdiction occurred immediately upon the filing of a voluntary
dismissal, the Cooper court was of the opinion that where the plaintiff claimed that he had
made a mistake, the court retained jurisdiction to review the filing.
25. See Briner v. Gilmore, 229 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969); Dreher v. American Fire
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
be taken without prejudice in the absence of a prior voluntary dis-
inissal.25 The problem represented by the decision in the Fears case
concerns the question of how far the plaintiff may go with his suit
before he loses that absolute right.2 7 Although the rule facially seems
quite specific as to the point in time at which the plaintiff loses the
right, situations have arisen which create difficulties in interpreting
the rule. For example, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
has interpreted the language "before submission of a nonjury case
to the court for decision" to permit a plaintiff to take a voluntary
dismissal at any time prior to resting his case."' Similarly, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, permitted a voluntary dis-
missal after judgment, when the trial court on rehearing had set
aside the judgment entered dismissing the complaint with prejudice
and giving the plaintiffs 30 days to amend their complaint. ' The
Fourth District has also held that voluntary dismissal is appropriate
& Cas. Co., 220 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969); Meyer v. Contemporary Broad. Co., 207 So.
2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
26. A second voluntary dismissal of the suit operates as an adjudication on the merits
which bars a future action on the same claim. See Briner v. Gilmore, 229 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1969); Rome v. Silver, 166 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). See also Massey, Hoffman,
and Linder, Civil Procedure, Eleventh Survey of Florida Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 257, 299
(1974). However, some question as to this provision has been raised, The two-dismissal rule
is only applicable where the dismissal of the prior action was voluntarily made by plaintiff.
Thus institution of a third suit is not foreclosed where one of the earlier dismissals was by
order of court. For a discussion of this question in relation to the analogous case under the
federal rules, see Barns, 1962 Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 276, 282 n.20 (1963).
A further point of controversy has been whether a plaintiff's right to a voluntary dismissal
is limited to a dismissal of the whole action, or whether plaintiff may exercise his right to
voluntary dismissal of a claim, or of all claims, as against some, but not all, defendants. See
Crump v. Gold House Rest., Inc., 96 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1957); Cooper v. Carroll, 239 So, 2d 511
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1970); Shannon v. McBride, 105 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
27. Consideration of this problem has led the Florida courts to recognize the tremendous
advantages given the plaintiff with the right to nonsuit; thus, the courts have been constantly
in the process of restricting and qualifying such right, For a general discussion on this subject
see Note, Florida's Unique Dismissal-The Non-suit, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 105, 122 (1960).
Because of the possible injustice to the defendants, the majority of American jurisdic-
tions have limited the right to nonsuit at least to specified stages of the proceedings. See,
e.g., Consumers' Power Co. v. McNichol, 287 F. 529 (6th Cir. 1923) (before the defendant be-
gins presentation of his defense); St. Louis, T.M. & S. Ry. v. Ingram, 118 Ark. 377, 176 S.W.
692 (1915) (before submission of the case to jury); Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Paonia Ditch Co.,
49 Colo. 281, 112 P. 692 (1911) (before trial); Gildea v. Lund, 131 Md. 385, 102 A. 467 (1917)
(before arguments on the facts have begun).
28. Modular Constr., Inc. v. Owen, 270 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). It appears from
the opinion that plaintiff's attorney had called all his witnesses, but in response to the
question of whether he had rested his case, he replied "No". Id. at 754.
29. City of Sunrise v. Florida State Bd. of Pub. Instr., 273 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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if filed prior to a date designated by the court at the close of final
argument for the filing of memoranda by counsel substantiating
their positions. :'" Also, where a plaintiff filed his voluntary dismissal
after the trial judge had dismissed his complaint with leave to
amend, the supreme court, reversing both the trial court and the
appellate court, held that the dismissal of the complaint with leave
to amend was interlocutory and thus did not cut off plaintiff's right
to file a voluntary dismissal within the time granted to amend the
dismissed complaint.'
In Fears, it clearly appears that the jury had not been advised
of the court's decision to grant a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant. :2 Thus, Fears stands for the proposition that in a jury
case, the plaintiff has an absolute right to take a voluntary dismissal
even after the trial judge has, in the absence of the jury, announced
his decision to grant a defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
In reaching its decision, the supreme court adopted the dissent-
ing opinion of Judge McCord at the district court of appeal level and
cited, in support, four recent district court of appeal cases which
involved the same question. The earliest of these cases is Meyer v.
Contemporary Broadcasting Co.33 which presented a factual situa-
tion quite similar to that in Fears. Meyer involved a suit for breach
of an employment contract. The case was tried before a jury and at
the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a directed
verdict. The trial judge indicated, during argument on defendant's
motion, and in the absence of the jury, 4 that he would grant the
30. Dreher v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 220 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969). Although
final argument had been completed, the case had not been "submitted to the court" since
the memoranda to be filed were "useful aids to [the judge's] ultimate decision." Id. at 436.
31. Hibbard v. State Road Dep't, 225 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1969).
32. See note 34 infra. It may be argued that a plaintiff's notice of dismissal would not
be timely and "before retirement of the jury" if it is given after the court has instructed the
jury that it was directing a verdict for the defendant. Indeed Judge McCord in his dissenting
opinion in the district court of appeal in Fears stated: "It appears that the point of no return
is reached when the judge announces the directed verdict to the jury. Up to that time,
plaintiff can take a voluntary dismissal." Fears v. Lunsford, 295 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1974) (McCord, J., dissenting), quashed, 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975).
33. 207 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
34. The importance of the fact that the jury was absent when the trial court granted
defendant's motion for a directed verdict is apparent from the appellate court's statement
that "the announcement by the plaintiff of the voluntary dismissal of the suit prior to any
announcement by the court to the jury that it was directing a verdict for the defendant was
timely . . . and was before retirement of the jury." Id. at 327 (emphasis added). Thus it
appears that if the motion had been granted in the jury's presence, a voluntary dismissal
announced thereafter would be untimely.
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motion. Plaintiff immediately announced that he was taking a vol-
untary dismissal of the suit. The trial judge stated that he had
already ruled on the motion, refused to allow the dismissal, called
the jury back in and announced that "the court here and now direct
[sic] a verdict for the defendant." 5 The District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, reversed. In reaching its decision, the court dis-
cussed the meaning of the phrases "without order of court" and
"before retirement of the jury," as they appear in rule 1.420 (a) (1).:I"
As to the latter phrase, the court stated that "a jury has not retired
until they are in the jury room and can only emerge therefrom or
have anything brought therein under the direction of the Court."' 7
As to the former phrase, the court stated that it gave the plaintiff
an absolute right to control the continuation of the litigation until
the hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the retirement of
the jury, or the submission of a nonjury case to the court for deci-
sion.:" Thus, it appears that the situation facing the First District
in Fears had already been decided by the Fourth District with the
opposite result.39
Continuing its analysis, the supreme court then considered
Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc."' In Rich
Motors the plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal in the face of an
adverse evidentiary ruling by the trial court. Later, the plaintiff
sought, and obtained, a reinstatement of the same action. On ap-
peal, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the
voluntary dismissal pursuant to rule 1.420 (a)(1) served to termi-
nate the action and to divest the court of jurisdiction.4" Accordingly,
the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant a rehearing on the
dismissal or to reinstate the original action.42 The court relied on
35. Id. at 327.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Indeed the petitioner in Fears relied on Meyer as a "red cow" case on the same facts
and reaching a "diametrically opposite conclusion" from the one reached by the First District
in Fears. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits for Certiorari at 6, 7, Fears v. Lunsford, 314 So.
2d 578 (Fla. 1975). This situation was recognized by the supreme court in finding conflict
between the First and Fourth Districts for the purpose of granting certiorari in Fears. See 314
So. 2d at 578-9.
40. 244 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
41. Id. at 528.
42. Although it is not mentioned in the court's opinion, it appears that the plaintiff in
Rich Motors was precluded from bringing a new action because the statute of limitations had
run. But see Petitioner's Brief on the Merits on Certiorari at 9, Fears v. Lunsford, 314 So. 2d
578 (Fla. 1975).
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Meyer in reaching its decision, inasmuch as that case had held that
rule 1.420 (a)(1) gave plaintiff absolute control over continuation
of the litigation.43 Although the factual pattern in Rich Motors is
distinguishable from the one in Fears, both the Rich Motors and the
Meyer cases show the liberal interpretation given by the Fourth
District to rule 1.420 (a)(1).
The position of the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
concerning voluntary dismissals is exemplified by Modular Con-
struction, Inc. v. Owen,4" which was cited in a footnote to the Fears
opinion.'" In Modular Construction, the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, stated that until the plaintiff had rested his case, it
could not be said that he had submitted his case to the court for a
decision, and thus his motion for voluntary dismissal was timely.,"
Although this case can be distinguished from Fears on the basis that
it did not involve a jury trial, it presents the liberal construction
given rule 1.420 (a)(1) by the Third District.
Finally, the supreme court in Fears v. Lunsford pointed out
that subsequent to the First District decision in Fears, a different
panel of that same court reached a directly contrary result in
DeMaupassant v. Evans. 7 There, the First District upheld the trial
court's decision allowing the plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal
after the defendant had made his closing arguments and during
plaintiff's rebuttal.'
Thus, when the Fears case came before the supreme court, the
district courts of appeal had already laid sufficient foundation to
support the result reached therein. Indeed, a contrary result in Fears
would have meant a direct overruling of the Meyer case discussed
above. In addition, more confusion would have been injected into
an area already plagued with more than its share of instability.
Thus it appears that the Fears decision is entirely consistent with
the expansive construction given by the courts to the time limita-
tions for voluntary dismissals under rule 1.420(a)(1). Furthermore,
43. 244 So. 2d at 527.
44. 270 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
45. 314 So. 2d at 579 n.3. The court cited Modular Construction in support of the
propositions that the plaintiff's right to take a voluntary dismissal is absolute and that once
plaintiff exercises his right, "[t]he only remaining action required by the court contemplated
by the rule would be to advise the jury thereof in a jury case." Id. at 579.
46. 270 So. 2d at 754.
47. 300 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
48. Id. at 314.
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the supreme court decision is also supported by the general principle
of statutory construction that, to the extent that a remedial statute
is in derogation of a common law right, it is to be liberally construed
in favor of that right.
However, although Fears seems to have been correctly decided
in light of the wording of the rule and its prior judicial construction,
Justice England, in a well reasoned dissenting opinion, urged an
examination of the rule's purpose rather than merely its words. In
Justice England's view, the rule contemplates that a plaintiff may
voluntarily dismiss his case before the jury retires to resolve ques-
tions of fact, or before the court rules against him on questions of
law. " He stated:
For purposes of allowing the plaintiff a second day in court on the
same cause of action, I see no distinction between commence-
ment of a summary judgment hearing and the "submission of a
nonjury case to the court for decision," on the one hand, and the
granting of a motion for directed verdict on the other. The latter
event, which is not expressly mentioned in the Rule, even more
clearly than the former events, which are mentioned in the Rule,
marks a point which separates the fact-finding process from the
courts' domain of pronouncing the law.'0
In his dissenting opinion, Justice England expressed his ap-
proval of the policy reasons given by the district court of appeal in
Fears for denying the plaintiff a new trial after the motion for di-
rected verdict was granted.' There the First District stated that the
purpose of the rules of procedure is "to expedite . . . disposition of
cases with fairness and justice to all parties." 2 The court had em-
phasized that:
The case for the application of [res judicata] is even stronger
here, for the issue of loss of consortium was actually litigated up
to the point when the trial court directed a verdict in favor of
[defendant] on that issue. . . .To allow [the plaintiff] to reli-
tigate this issue when the [defendants] have already had a rul-
49. 314 So. 2d at 580 (England, J., dissenting).
50. Id. In support of his comparison of a motion for summary judgment with a motion
for a directed verdict, Justice England, citing Chowning v. Pierce, 174 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965), stated that both these motions require the same judicial evaluation of factual allega-
tions. He also considered that when a motion for directed verdict is granted, the litigation of
the issues involved is ended as a matter of law. 314 So. 2d at 580 n.3 (England, J., dissenting).
51. 314 So. 2d at 580.
52. Fears v. Lunsford, 295 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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ing favorable to them would be to defeat justice and prolong
litigation.'
Thus Justice England concurred with the lower court's restric-
tive interpretation of the rule. Indeed, his proposed analogy between
summary judgment and directed verdict seems convincing, and his
policy argument is in line with the modern trend in the federal
courts and other states to restrict the use of voluntary dismissals.4
However, the fact remains that the majority decision was correct in
light of the language of the rule and its previous interpretations.
Justice Overton in his concurring opinion in Fears"5 confronts
the dilemma in a more direct manner than does Justice England.
Justice Overton recognized the problems involved with the present
rule, and the inequitable results which it may produce. He stated:
I do not agree with the rule of procedure as it is written, because
of the type of result that has occurred in the instant case. How-
ever, this is what was intended by the rule. If we desire to make
a change we should do so in the rule. "
Another avenue of approach not noted by the dissent, but sup-
porting its position, is suggested by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.480(a), which states: "The order directing a verdict is effective
without any assent of the jury." Thus, it appears that once the judge
has granted the directed verdict the case is concluded, and the
remaining practice of instructing the jury is a mere formality, which
cannot be taken as extending the plaintiff's time for taking a volun-
tary dismissal.
It seems that Fears, although decided in conformity with the
present language of the rule and modern judicial precedent in the
Florida district courts of appeal, is not a happy solution to the
problem of voluntary dismissals in this state, especially when
viewed in light of the modern trend in the federal courts and most
state courts to restrict the use of voluntary dismissals. 7 Even some
of the judges that have supported the present permissive trend in
Florida have felt compelled to do so solely by reason of the language
of the rule. Thus, as Judge McCord stated in his dissenting opinion:
53. Id.
54. See note 27 supra. See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, § 2363.
55. 314 So. 2d at 579-80 (Overton, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. For a comprehensive discussion of the status of voluntary dismissals in the federal
courts, see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at §§ 2361-76.
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While I do not consider that a plaintiff should have the right to
take a voluntary dismissal after the trial judge has announced,
out of the jury's presence that a defendant's motion for directed
verdict will be granted, I am of the opinion that Rule 1.420 (a)
(1) . . . gives him that right."
Similarly, the court in DeMaupassant stated:
We cannot be critical of plaintiff's attorney for taking tactical
advantage of the rule. However, as the rule was applied in the
case sub judice it is easy to see how an injustice might result
. . . . [W]e feel that the rule should be changed to prevent
voluntary dismissals, without order of court, of co-defendants at
the end of a trial after they have had an opportunity to "heap it
on" the remaining defendant or defendants."
The same critical attitude is present among some of the justices on
the Supreme Court of Florida, as shown by the opinions of Justices
England and Overton."'
The object of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is "to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."',
The achievement of this purpose seems best served by allowing the
plaintiff only a very brief period of unrestrained control over the
litigation. Once the expense of preparation for trial has begun to
mount, and the interests of the other party are adversely affected,
a dismissal should be permitted only in the exercise of sound judi-
cial discretion, and then only when tempered by such terms and
conditions as the court deems just.
Furthermore, the circumstances which led to the recognition of
the common law nonsuit no longer exist in modern day practice."
Difficulties in communication and transportation may have justi-
fied the procedure at early common law in order to allow a plaintiff
to appear and present his case. However, today, where such difficul-
ties no longer exist, this procedural device has been converted into
an instrument of unfair advantage to the plaintiff, who can discon-
58. Fears v. Lunsford, 295 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st Dist 1974) (McCord, J., dissenting),
quashed 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975).
59. DeMaupassant v. Evans, 300 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
60. See text accompanying notes 50 and 56 supra.
61. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010.
62. See generally Head, The History and Development of Nonsuit, 27 W. VA. L.Q. 20
(1920); Note, The Right of a Plaintiff to Take a Voluntary Nonsuit or to Dismiss His Action
Without Prejudice, 37 VA. L. REv. 969 (1951).
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tinue his action in order to present a better case whenever he faces
an adverse ruling.
The voluntary dismissal rule, as it now exists in Florida, is a
highly questionable procedural remedy which may frequently result
in wasted time, effort, and expense. For example, in a case in which
the defendant has called his witnesses from great distances, a jury
has been impanelled, and witnesses' testimony taken, the plaintiff,
sensing a verdict about to be directed against him, may dismiss the
action only to bring the suit again at a later date. This situation
presents "an outrageous imposition not only on the defendant, but
also on the court. '"6
3
To solve the problem, it appears that rather than giving a re-
strictive construction to the wording of the present rule as proposed
by Justice England in his dissenting opinion, a change in the word-
ing of the rule is in order. As discussed above, the necessity for
change has been recognized by several members of the judiciary in
Florida." One solution would be to delete rule 1.420 (a)(1) while
retaining rule 1.420 (a)(2).15 This would abolish voluntary dismis-
sals as of right, while leaving the question of whether such volun-
tary dismissal should be allowed within the sound discretion of the
trial court. " Alternatively, the wording of rule 1.420 (a)(1) could be
changed to conform to the present language of federal rule 41 (a)
(1).17 This would limit the time within which a plaintiff may dismiss
as a matter of right to any time before service by the adversary party
63. McCann v. Bentley Stores Corp., 34 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
64. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
65. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420 (a)(2) deals with voluntary dismissals by order of court. It states
in part that: "Except as provided in subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, an action shall not be
dismissed at a party's instance except on order of the court and upon such terms and condi-
tions as the court deems proper." Thus, eliminating subdivision (a)(1) would leave the entire
subject of voluntary dismissal to the discretion of the court, which could consider the equities
involved on a case by case basis, and render an appropriate order. The order of dismissal could
obviously be conditioned on the plaintiff compensating the defendant for reasonable expenses
incurred.
66. This solution has been suggested in regard to FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1), in an attempt
to eliminate problems of construction of the language of the federal rule. See Note, 1962 DUKE
L.J. 285, 289; 63 YALE L.J. 738, 743 (1954).
67. This solution, however, will import into Florida practice the problems of language
construction which have been encountered in federal practice in connection with federal rule
41(a)(1). See Note, 1962 DUKE L.J. 285. It should be noted that the 1962 version of rule 1.420
(a)(1), then rule 1.35 (a)(1), was essentially identical to federal rule 41(a)(1). Compare note
14 with note 13 supra.
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of an answer or a motion for summary judgment, whichever comes
first." Another avenue of approach would be to change the language
of rule 1.420 (a)(1) so as to deny voluntary dismissals as of right
after the court has had an opportunity to consider the merits of the
controversy."' This change would obviously vest some discretion in
the trial court but would not completely abolish the plaintiff's right
to a voluntary dismissal.' "
Any of the suggested changes will relieve the injustice that the
present Florida rule now works on defendants. Each would also
expedite disposition of cases and eliminate the needless expendi-
tures of time, effort, and resources associated with the relitigation
of issues that the present rule encourages. The purpose of the Flor-
ida Rules of Civil Procedure, "to secure the just, speedy and inex-
pensive determination of every action"'" would thus be better
served.
HENRY A. LOPEZ-AGUIAR
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1).
69. This solution has been suggested in connection with proposed amendments to FED.
R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1) in 1962 DUKE L.J. 285. That article presents a good summary of the
problems involved in applying the federal rule in its present language and the policy reasons
behind the suggested change.
70. See 1962 DUKE L.J. 285.
71. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010.
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